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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal and cross-appeal, we are confronted with 
a tension between bankruptcy law and labor law. The 
dispute arose when the Air Line Pilots Association, Inc. 
("ALPA"), collective bargaining agent for Eastern Air Lines' 
("Eastern") pilots, filed proofs of claim in bankruptcy court 
against Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc. and Continental 
Airlines, Inc. ("Continental"). These claims were based on 
alleged seniority integration rights stemming from a 
pending labor arbitration dispute and were filed following 
Continental's acquisition of Eastern and subsequent refusal 
to bargain over the seniority integration of Eastern's pilots. 
 
The bankruptcy court determined that the claims could 
be satisfied by monetary awards in lieu of specific 
performance and enjoined scheduled arbitration 
proceedings to enforce the seniority rights under the 
collective bargaining agreement. The district court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court's determination relating to the claims, 
but vacated the injunction. Two groups of former Eastern 
pilots, the LPP Claimants and the Group of 31, both of 
which are no longer represented by ALPA, appealed to this 
court.1 
 
Resolution of this dispute requires us to determine: (1) 
whether the bankruptcy claims that the LPP Claimants and 
the Group of 31 seek to enforce constitute "claims" within 
the meaning of the bankruptcy code and thus are 
satisfiable, in the alternative, by a monetary award; and (2) 
whether the arbitration of a labor dispute that may give rise 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "LPP Claimants" refers to a group of former Eastern pilots whose 
claims in this appeal are based on certain "labor protective provisions" 
(LPPs) contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The "Group of 
31" is a group of former Eastern pilots, who originally were part of the 
"LPP Claimants" group and who have retained separate counsel for 
purposes of this appeal. See discussion infra Part I.D. While both groups 
claims were filed in bankruptcy court by ALPA on their behalf, these two 
groups are no longer represented by ALPA. See discussion infra note 5. 
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to the right to seniority integration under a collective 
bargaining agreement can be enjoined, where the debtor 
has not explicitly rejected the agreement. We conclude that 
the rights to seniority integration do constitute "claims" 
within the meaning of the bankruptcy code. Accordingly, we 
find that the right to seniority integration gives rise to a 
right of payment and that any equitable remedy recovered 
against Continental via arbitration of the underlying labor 
dispute may be satisfied through an award of monetary 
damages. We further conclude that the district court 
properly vacated the injunction barring arbitration of the 
underlying labor dispute. Thus, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. The Underlying LPP Dispute 
 
On February 23, 1986, following intense negotiations, 
Eastern and its pilots' union, ALPA, ratified a collective 
bargaining agreement. On February 24, 1986, the Texas Air 
Corporation ("Texas Air"), parent corporation to 
Continental, acquired Eastern. Believing that the 
acquisition constituted a "merger" within the meaning of 
certain "labor protective provisions" (LPPs) contained in the 
collective bargaining agreement, ALPA requested a meeting 
with Texas Air, Eastern, and Continental to discuss the 
integration of Eastern's and Continental's seniority lists. 
Under the LPPs, Eastern's pilots secured protection of their 
seniority rights in the event of a merger between Eastern 
and another airline carrier through the integration of 
Eastern's seniority lists with the merging carrier's list. 
Specifically, the LPP terms provide: 
 
       Section 2(a).  The term "merger" as used herein means 
       joint action by the two carriers whereby they unify, 
       consolidate, merge, or pool in whole or in part their 
       separate airline facilities or any of the operations or 
       services previously performed by them through such 
       separate facilities. 
 
* * * 
 
       Section 3.  Insofar as the merger affects the seniority 
       rights of the carriers' employees, provisions shall be 
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       made for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and 
       equitable manner, including, where applicable, 
       agreement through collective bargaining between the 
       carriers and the representative of the employees 
       affected. In the event of failure to agree, the dispute 
       may be submitted by either party for adjustment in 
       accordance with section 13. 
 
* * * 
 
       Section 13(a).  In the event that any dispute or 
       controversy . . . arises with respect to the protections 
       provided herein, which cannot be settled by the parties 
       within 20 days after the controversy arises, it may be 
       referred by any party to an arbitrator selected from a 
       panel of seven names furnished by the National 
       Mediation Board for consideration and determination. 
 
(Labor Protective Provisions, sections 2(a), 3, and 13(a)).2 
 
Despite ALPA's requests, both Eastern and Continental 
refused to bargain with ALPA about the integration of the 
seniority lists. Consequently, ALPA requested the National 
Mediation Board to proffer a list of seven arbitrators from 
which a neutral arbitrator could be chosen to determine 
whether an alleged merger occurred between Eastern and 
Continental that triggered the LPP seniority integration 
provision (LPP dispute). Eastern, however, filed for 
bankruptcy in March, 1989, and refused to submit to 
arbitration pursuant to the bankruptcy code's section 362 
automatic stay provision. 11 U.S.C. S 362 (providing that 
petitions filed pursuant to Chapter 11 operate as a stay of 
the commencement or continuation of judicial, 
administrative, or other actions or proceedings against the 
debtor). In bankruptcy court, ALPA sought relief from the 
automatic stay to compel Eastern to arbitrate the LPP 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The LPPs were based on the standard Allegheny-Mohawk LPPs, which 
were designed to provide "displacement and dismissal allowances to 
employees adversely affected by [merger] transaction[s], the equitable 
integration of seniority lists, and binding arbitration of disputes 
relating 
to the LPPs." (Decision of the Eastern Air Lines Pilots System Board of 
Adjustment). See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dept. of Transp., 838 F.2d 563, 
565 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, 59 C.A.B. 
22 (1972)). 
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dispute. The bankruptcy court denied ALPA's petition. After 
much litigation, however, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that the section 362 automatic stay 
provision did not preclude arbitration in this instance. See 
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 922 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 
ALPA and Eastern proceeded to arbitration in April, 
1991, commencing with a pre-hearing conference before 
Richard R. Kasher (Kasher Arbitration). In this proceeding, 
ALPA sought prospective integration of seniority lists, back 
pay from the effective date of the merger to the date of the 
arbitration award, and front pay from the date of the 
arbitration award to the date that the Eastern pilots would 
complete training and begin flying for Continental. Prior to 
the pre-hearing conference, Arbitrator Kasher solicited brief 
statements of position from the parties to the dispute, and 
from all potential parties. Eastern consistently maintained 
that the LPP dispute was not properly within the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction.3 Continental filed a statement 
informing Arbitrator Kasher that it had filed a Chapter 11 
petition for reorganization in December, 1990. Therefore, it 
maintained that the arbitration pursued by ALPA was 
stayed under section 362 of the bankruptcy code and could 
not proceed without the express approval of the bankruptcy 
court. 
 
In August, 1992, Arbitrator Kasher issued a decision 
concluding that he had jurisdiction over the LPP dispute, 
and could render a determination of the appropriate 
remedies under the circumstances. Kasher, relying on the 
bankruptcy court's determination in In re Ionosphere Clubs, 
Inc., 114 B.R. 379 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), specifically 
rejected Continental's suggestion that the arbitration was 
barred by the automatic stay. Kasher scheduled hearings 
on the merits of the dispute, to commence in February, 
1993. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Eastern maintained that only the System Board of Adjustment had 
jurisdiction to determine whether a merger occurred that triggered the 
LPPs. On the merits, Eastern contended that if the arbitration proceeded, 
the Arbitrator should conclude that no merger occurred. 
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B. The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings 
 
In September, 1991, while the initial Kasher Arbitration 
decision was pending, ALPA, on behalf of its members, filed 
proofs of claim against Continental in Delaware Bankruptcy 
Court. Their claims were based on the asserted right to 
seniority integration under the LPPs and specified an 
unliquidated amount as the debt for which Continental was 
obligated. In response, Continental initiated an adversary 
proceeding in bankruptcy court against ALPA, seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief relating to the proofs of 
claim. In that action, Continental filed a Partial Objection 
To Allowance of Claims and a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on its Partial Objection.4 In both motions, 
Continental contended that the seniority integration that 
the claimants sought was not feasible because it would be 
detrimental to Continental's successful reorganization. 
Thus, Continental sought a declaration that the claims 
were, at best, "general, dischargeable, pre-petition, 
unsecured claims," compensable by an award of monetary 
damages. 
 
ALPA and the LPP Claimants each filed a separate 
response to Continental's Partial Objection and Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment.5 ALPA contended that, 
contrary to Continental's argument, the claims pursued 
were not general, unsecured pre-petition claims that could 
be converted to a payment of money damages. ALPA also 
argued that only an arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Prior to the Kasher Arbitration decision, Continental filed an initial 
motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a preliminary injunction. 
Continental argued that the arbitration should be enjoined to protect the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the administration of its 
estate. 
It also maintained that the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy 
code precluded the arbitration from proceeding. Finally, Continental 
contended that it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement 
between Eastern and ALPA and that it could not be bound by the result 
of any arbitration over the LPPs. 
 
5. ALPA's representation of the LPP Claimants ceased after the LPP 
Claimants instituted actions in federal court against ALPA. The actions 
alleged causes of action for the breach of the duty of fair representation 
and defamation arising out of the publication and dissemination of a 
"blacklist" and for alleged violations of the civil provisions of RICO. 
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the appropriate remedy under the LPPs. The LPP Claimants 
essentially maintained that an arbitration proceeding was 
the appropriate forum to determine the issue of whether a 
merger occurred that triggered the LPPs, and that the 
proper remedy was integration of Eastern's seniority lists 
with Continental's lists. 
 
In February, 1993, the bankruptcy court judge, in two 
orders, granted Continental's Partial Objection To 
Allowance of Claims and its related motion for partial 
summary judgment, determining that there was no genuine 
issue for trial and that Continental was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 
et al., Nos. 90-932 through 90-984 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 
1993) (order granting motion for partial objection to 
allowance of claims); In re Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., 
No. 91-153 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 1993) (order granting 
motion for partial summary judgment). Addressing the 
jurisdictional argument asserted by ALPA, the bankruptcy 
court concluded that the issue of whether any award 
granted to ALPA would constitute general, unsecured, pre- 
petition claims was a core matter under the bankruptcy 
code. Thus, it concluded that it had jurisdiction to resolve 
the matter. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., Nos. 90- 
932 through 90-984, slip op. at 1-2 (order granting motion 
for partial objection to allowance of claims); In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 91-153, slip op. at 2 
(order granting motion for partial summary judgment). The 
court then determined that the equitable remedy of 
seniority integration constituted a "claim" within the 
meaning of S 101(5) of the bankruptcy code. Accordingly, 
the court concluded that the remedy could be converted to 
an award of money damages. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 
et al., Nos. 90-932 through 90-984, slip op. at 3-4 (order 
granting motion for partial objection to allowance of claims); 
In re Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 91-153, slip op. at 
3-4 (order granting motion for partial summary judgment). 
Finally, the court determined that any right of payment 
asserted by ALPA was, at best, a general, dischargeable, 
unsecured claim that was entitled to no administrative 
priority. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., Nos. 90-932 
through 90-984, slip op. at 4-5 (order granting motion for 
partial objection to allowance of claims); In re Continental 
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Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 91-153, slip op. at 5 (order granting 
motion for partial summary judgment). 
 
In April, 1993, Continental's Second Amended Joint Plan 
of Reorganization was confirmed by the bankruptcy court. 
The court's confirmation order incorporated its prior rulings 
from the two orders issued in February, 1993. Essentially, 
it clarified that any valid claims based on the LPPs would 
give rise to a right of payment dischargeable in bankruptcy 
and that no right to injunctive, equitable or other 
prospective relief would flow from any valid claim based on 
an award under the LPPs. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., et 
al., Nos. 90-932 through 90-984 (Bankr. D. Del. April, 
1993) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Confirming the Debtors' Revised Second Amended Joint 
Plan of Reorganization). The court also enjoined the 
arbitration of the LPP dispute. Continental's plan of 
reorganization was consummated in late April, 1993. 
 
C. The ALPA/Continental Settlement 
 
ALPA and the LPP Claimants appealed the bankruptcy 
court's February and April, 1993 orders to the district 
court. While the appeals were pending, ALPA and 
Continental settled the LPP dispute. The Settlement 
Agreement, ultimately approved by the bankruptcy court, 
finally resolved all of ALPA's claims including those pursued 
in Continental's bankruptcy proceeding and those based on 
the enforcement of the LPPs in the Kasher Arbitration. 
Under the terms of the agreement, ALPA agreed to 
withdraw its appeals to the district court. The Settlement 
Agreement also provided an option to the "pilots formerly 
employed by Eastern" who were no longer represented by 
ALPA, and who had filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, to participate in the settlement. Approximately 
two-thirds of these pilots did so. 
 
D. The District Court Proceedings 
 
Prior to the ALPA/Continental settlement, Continental 
filed a motion to dismiss ALPA's and the LPP Claimants' 
appeals. Continental argued that the appeals from the 
confirmation order were moot because: (1) the plan of 
reorganization had been substantially consummated; (2) it 
was not feasible for the plan to be undone; and (3) any 
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alteration to the plan's fundamental terms would be 
inequitable. After the settlement, Continental filed a second 
motion to dismiss the appeals as moot, contending that the 
LPP Claimants had no individual right to maintain their 
claims based on the LPPs because ALPA, as the exclusive 
bargaining representative of the Eastern pilots, had full 
authority to settle the LPP grievance. Thus, Continental 
argued, the pilots were bound by the settlement agreement. 
 
In a comprehensive memorandum opinion, the district 
court addressed the issues appealed by ALPA and the LPP 
Claimants and presented in Continental's motions to  
dismiss.6 As to the first motion to dismiss, the court 
concluded, inter alia, that ALPA's and the LPP Claimants' 
appeals relating to the claim for administrative priority was 
moot. In support of its conclusion, the court emphasized 
the substantial consummation of the plan. Specifically, the 
court noted that the investment leading to the 
consummation of the plan was based on an overall limit on 
administrative claims and a determination that ALPA and 
the LPP Claimants were not entitled to equitable relief. In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 93-163 (D. Del. Nov. 29, 
1995). As to Continental's second motion to dismiss as 
moot, the court determined that it could not consider the 
merits of whether the LPP Claimants had standing under 
the LPPs to pursue seniority integration individually. 
Specifically, the court concluded that this issue should be 
determined by the arbitrator. Therefore, the court refused 
to dismiss their claims based on their alleged lack of 
standing to assert the contractual right. Id. at 22-25. The 
court also rejected Continental's argument that the LPP 
Claimants were bound by the ALPA/Continental settlement. 
Id. at 23. 
 
Turning to the merits of the appeals, the court affirmed 
the orders of the bankruptcy court in all respects, except 
for the bankruptcy court's injunction of the arbitration 
proceedings. Id. at 26-45. Relating to the injunction, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the ALPA/Continental settlement agreement provided that 
ALPA would dismiss its appeal to the district court, ALPA failed to do so 
prior to the district court's disposition. Ultimately, ALPA did withdraw 
its 
claims against Continental. ALPA is not a party to this appeal. 
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court concluded that the bankruptcy court's failure to 
adequately set forth the reasons for the issuance of the 
injunction and to describe the acts restrained in its order, 
as mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), was 
fatal to the validity of the injunction. Id. at 34-37. Although 
it vacated the injunction, the district court refused to 
remand the matter to the bankruptcy court with 
instructions to strike the injunction. Rather, the court 
concluded that under section 1113 of the bankruptcy code, 
the bankruptcy court could not enjoin the arbitration even 
if the requirements of Rule 65(d) were met. Id. at 37-40.7 
 
The LPP Claimants appealed the district court's order. 
Continental cross-appealed on the issues of the mootness 
of the claims and the dissolution of the injunction. On 
appeal, the Group of 31, a group of former Eastern pilots 
who previously had been represented by counsel for the 
LPP Claimants, have obtained substitute counsel, and have 
filed a separate brief. For purposes of brevity, the Group of 
31 and the LPP Claimants will be referred to collectively as 
"the Claimants" where permissible. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a). We exercise jurisdiction of the appeal and the 
cross-appeal from the district court's order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 158(d). 
 
II. 
 
Our review of the district court's determination is 
plenary. Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit 
Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988); see In re Ionosphere 
Clubs, Inc., 922 F.2d 984, 988 (2d Cir. 1990). We exercise 
the same review of the district court's decision as that 
exercised by the district court. Brown, 851 F.2d at 84. The 
bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewable only for 
clear error. Id. Legal determinations are subject to plenary 
review. Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The court reached this issue only after determining that in spite of 
the 
invalidity of the injunction under Rule 65(d), the statutory injunction 
under 11 U.S.C. S 524, referenced by the bankruptcy court in its order, 
survived. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 93-163, slip op. 
at 37, 
(D. Del. Nov. 29, 1995). 
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Before we reach the merits of the parties' claims, we 
must address Continental's two challenges to the 
Claimants' appeals contending that the appeals should be 
dismissed. First, Continental maintains that the LPP 
Claimants' notice of appeal is defective for lack of adequate 
identification of the parties to the appeal under Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c). Next, Continental argues 
that the Claimants' lack standing to assert claims for 
individual seniority integration under the LPPs and that the 
appeals should be dismissed as moot. 
 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
Continental requests that the LPP Claimants' appeal be 
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
3(c) for failure of their notice of appeal to identify each 
member of its group participating in this appeal. The notice 
of appeal filed by the LPP Claimants simply identifies the 
appellants as "the LPP Claimants." Continental argues that 
this identification is insufficient, emphasizing that a 
number of the LPP Claimants participated in the 
Continental/ALPA settlement and, consequently, waived 
their claims on appeal. Continental contends that the 
notice of appeal did not specify those members who did not 
waive their claims and who are appealing from the district 
court's order. We reject this argument, and conclude that 
the LPP Claimants notice of appeal adequately identifies the 
appellants. 
 
The requirements of Rule 3(c) are jurisdictional. Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 320-21, 108 S. Ct. 
2405, 2411, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988). In Torres, the 
Supreme Court explained that permitting a court to 
exercise jurisdiction over parties not named in a notice of 
appeal would be equivalent to extending the time 
prescribed to file a notice of appeal, a power not granted to 
the court. Id. at 315. Thus, the failure of a notice of appeal 
to name a party constitutes a jurisdictional bar to the 
appeal, and thus a failure of that party to appeal. Dura 
Systems, Inc. v. Rothbury Investments, Ltd., 886 F.2d 551, 
554 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Generally, rules of procedure should be liberally 
construed. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316. In Torres, the Supreme 
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Court emphasized that, "mere technicalities should not 
stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits." 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, in the context of 
Rule 3(c), jurisdiction may be appropriate if a litigant's 
actions are functionally equivalent to the requirements of 
Rule 3(c). Masquerade Novelty v. Unique Industries, 912 
F.2d 663, 665 (3d Cir. 1990). We have applied this 
construction numerous times to support a finding of 
jurisdiction in the absence of strict, technical compliance 
with the requirements of Rule 3(c). See id. (where the 
contents of documents filed within the time prescribed to 
file a notice of appeal contain the information required by 
Rule 3(c), the party will be deemed to have complied with 
the rule and the case will not be dismissed for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction); Dura Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d at 554- 
55 (Consent Order filed by the appellants within the time 
prescribed to file a notice of appeal served as the 
"functional equivalent" of what Rule 3(c) required such that 
the technical failure of the actual notice of appeal was not 
a bar to jurisdiction); see also In re Bertoli, 812 F.2d 136 
(3d Cir. 1987) (litigant's filing of a "Notice of Motion for 
Certification of An Interlocutory Appeal" in the district court 
within the thirty-day time period allowed to file a notice of 
appeal was sufficient to satisfy Rule 3(c) where the litigant 
failed to file an actual notice of appeal; the document 
communicated an intention to appeal and identified the 
judgment appealed from and the court to which the appeal 
was taken). 
 
The purpose of Rule 3(c)'s identification requirement is to 
provide notice to the court and the opposing parties of the 
identity of the appellants. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318; Dura 
Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d at 555. Since ALPA and the LPP 
Claimants filed their appeals in the district court, the LPP 
Claimants have been identified as a group of former 
Eastern pilots, no longer represented by ALPA, seeking to 
enforce their seniority integration rights under the LPPs. 
When ALPA settled its claims with Continental, both 
Continental and ALPA, via the settlement agreement, 
granted the LPP Claimants the opportunity to participate in 
the settlement. Continental was well aware of the 
individuals who elected to exercise this option. The 
settlement agreement specifically required those pilots 
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electing to participate in the settlement to execute one of 
two forms indicating an intent to participate in the 
settlement and to return the form to Continental. Those 
individuals who opted to settle their claims waived their 
right to appeal. Thus, the group of LPP Claimants dwindled 
to an identifiable, discrete entity made up of those 
individual pilots who chose not to participate in the 
settlement. 
 
The term "LPP Claimants" has been subject to a common 
understanding among all parties to this litigation relating to 
the individuals comprising the group. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the LPP Claimants' notice of appeal 
sufficiently identifies the entity such that Continental, as 
well as this Court, is adequately apprised of the identity of 
the appellants such that appellate jurisdiction is proper. In 
so doing, we follow the Supreme Court's directive to 
construe Rule 3(c) liberally and to avoid a construction that 
would permit "mere technicalities" to bar the consideration 
of this case on the merits. Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 
666 (quoting Dura Systems, 886 F.2d at 555). 
 
B. Whether the Claimants' Appeals are Moot 
 
Continental argues that the Claimants' appeals are moot, 
relying on ALPA's settlement of its LPP dispute with 
Continental. Essentially, Continental maintains that the 
claim settled by ALPA was a "group" claim. Thus, 
Continental argues, when ALPA settled the dispute, it 
settled the claim on behalf of the entire group on whose 
behalf it filed the bankruptcy claims, including the Group 
of 31 and the LPP Claimants. According to Continental, 
then the relevant question is whether "if [individual rights 
to seniority integration arbitration under the LPPs] existed 
at all, [those] rights survived ALPA's settlement of the group 
grievance." In the district court, Continental challenged the 
LPP Claimants' individual standing under the LPPs to 
prosecute their rights to seniority integration. The district 
court declined to consider the merits of this argument, 
explaining that the issue constituted a "minor" dispute 
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. SS 151-163, and 
was subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. We 
conclude that because the Claimants' individual rights to 
prosecute their claims for seniority integration have not 
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been established under the LPPs, we need not address 
whether the Claimants' individual rights to seniority 
integration survived ALPA's settlement of the dispute. 
 
The right to seniority integration under the LPPs turns on 
whether a "merger" between Eastern and Continental 
occurred within the meaning of the LPPs. This 
determination depends on the meaning, interpretation and 
proper application of the LPPs. In turn, the issue of 
standing to maintain an individual claim for seniority 
integration under the LPPs is a "minor" dispute under the 
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. SS 151-163. See Consolidated 
Rail v. Labor Executives, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989) ("major 
disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes 
to enforce them") (quoting Elgin, J & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 
325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 1289-90, 89 L.Ed. 1886 
(1945) (minor disputes are those relating either to the 
meaning or proper application of a particular provision with 
reference to a specific situation)); Chicago & Northwestern 
Transp. v. Local Union 214, 829 F.2d 1424, 1427 (7th Cir. 
1987). Accordingly, the issue of standing is subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and the district 
court properly concluded that its role relating to this issue 
was to protect the jurisdiction of the arbitration board. 
Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 304 ("the[National Railroad 
Adjustment] Board . . . has exclusive jurisdiction over 
minor disputes. Judicial review of the arbitral decision is 
limited."); Chicago & Northwestern Transp., 829 F.2d at 
1428. 
 
Consistent with the federal courts' role relating to minor 
disputes, i.e., to protect the jurisdiction of the arbitration 
board, federal courts cannot inquire into the merits of an 
underlying dispute except to the extent necessary to 
determine its proper characterization as minor or major. 
Chicago & Northwestern Transp., 829 F.2d at 1428. Nor 
may the courts decide what remedy is appropriate if the 
agreement is interpreted to require recovery of a remedy. 
General Com of Adj., United Transp. Union v. CSX R.R., 893 
F.2d 584, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, the district court 
properly concluded that it could not consider the merits of 
Continental's argument that the Claimants did not have 
standing under the LPPs. As the Claimants' right to 
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prosecute their claims for seniority integration have not 
been established under the LPPs, we find that we need not 
address Continental's argument that their individual rights 
did not survive ALPA's settlement of the LPP dispute. 
 
C. Merits of the Appeal 
 
1. Bankruptcy Court's Jurisdiction 
 
Before we determine whether the bankruptcy court 
properly determined the status of the Claimants' claims, we 
must address the Claimants' contention that the 
bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over the matter. 
The Claimants maintain that because the LPP dispute arose 
wholly outside the bankruptcy context, the matter is a 
"non-core" dispute over which the bankruptcy court did not 
have jurisdiction. The flaw in the Claimants' argument is 
that they confuse the disposition of the merits of the 
underlying LPP dispute with the treatment of their claims 
in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the latter. 
 
A bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over all "core 
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case 
under title 11." 28 U.S.C. S 157(b)(1) (1993); In re Wood, 
825 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1987). Section 157(b) does not 
define "core proceedings." However, the phrase has been 
interpreted to apply to those rights that are created by 
federal bankruptcy law: 
 
       If the proceeding involves a right created by the federal 
       bankruptcy law, it is a core proceeding . . . If the 
       proceeding is one that would arise only in bankruptcy, 
       it is also a core proceeding; for example, the filing of a 
       proof of claim or an objection to the discharge of a 
       particular debt. 
 
In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 97. See Beard v. Braunstein, 914 
F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1990) (acknowledging the standard for 
"core proceedings" articulated in Wood). 
 
There can be no dispute that the issue as to whether the 
bankruptcy claim could be satisfied by a monetary award is 
a "core bankruptcy matter." By filing a proof of claim 
against Continental's estate in bankruptcy court, the 
Claimants "invoke[d] the special rules of bankruptcy 
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concerning objections to the claim, [and] estimation of the 
claim." Wood, 825 F.2d at 97. Further, the issue decided by 
the bankruptcy court was how the claim would be treated 
in bankruptcy. Thus, the bankruptcy court was well within 
its authority to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of the 
status of the bankruptcy claim. Our conclusion is 
consistent with principles that govern the disposition of 
issues when bankruptcy law and labor law intersect. See 
L.O. Koven & Brothers, Inc. v. Local Union No. 5767, 381 
F.2d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 1966) ("Questions involving an 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act should be decided by 
the court, while questions involving an interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement should if feasible be 
decided by the arbitrator."); see also Garland Coal & Mining 
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 778 F.2d 1297, 1304 (8th Cir. 
1985) ("Once the arbitrator has decided the liability issue, 
the case should be returned to the bankruptcy court to 
decide the questions of allowability and priority of claims."). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the bankruptcy court had 
jurisdiction to determine whether the Claimants' claims 
could be satisfied by a monetary award in lieu of specific 
performance.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. For the same reasons, we reject the Group of 31's efforts to invoke the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. S 101, et seq., to implicate the 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to determine how the claims will be 
treated in bankruptcy. Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides: 
 
       No court of the United States as defined in this chapter, shall 
have 
       jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or 
       permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor 
       dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this 
       chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or 
       permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy 
       declared in this chapter. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 101. 
 
The Group of 31 contends that despite the district court's order 
vacating the injunction the ruling that the remedy in arbitration can be 
"reduced" from full seniority integration to a claim for front pay "is as 
clearly an injunction and interference with the Kasher arbitration as was 
the bankruptcy court's blanket injunction against the continuation of the 
arbitration." The conversion of the equitable remedy to front pay, upon 
successful challenge at the arbitration proceedings, only affects the 
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2. Whether the Equitable Remedy Constitutes a Claim 
   Under the Bankruptcy Code 
 
The LPP Claimants' and the Group of 31's primary 
contention on appeal is that the right to the equitable 
remedy of seniority integration under the LPPs cannot be 
converted into a claim for money damages. The Claimants 
emphasize that they seek specific performance under the 
LPPs, and they vehemently argue that the payment of 
money damages is not a viable alternative to the equitable 
right to seniority integration. 
 
The district court rejected the Claimants' argument, 
holding that seniority integration under the LPPs gave rise 
to a "right of payment" within the definition of a "claim" 
under the bankruptcy code. In support of its conclusion, 
the district court further determined that money damages 
are a viable alternative to seniority integration. 
 
The bankruptcy code defines "claim" as 
 
       (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of 
       performance if such breach gives rise to a right to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
administration of the claim in bankruptcy. It does not operate to enjoin 
the arbitrator, nor does it dictate any particular remedy. Cf. Lukens, 989 
F.2d at 677 (order directing an arbitrator not to preside over any newly 
ordered arbitration and deeming prior arbitration ineffectual involved 
operated as an injunction). Thus, we will not disturb the bankruptcy 
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the matter. 
 
Similarly we reject the Claimants' argument that the determination 
whether the equitable remedy can be converted to a payment of money 
damages is inconsistent with the district court's conclusion that the 
individual right to seniority integration under the LPPs involves a 
"minor" dispute, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 
See discussion, supra Part II.B. We discern no inconsistency between the 
bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction to determine the status of the 
bankruptcy claim and the district court's characterization of the issue of 
the Claimants' standing under the LPPs as a "minor" dispute. The 
bankruptcy court's ruling related only to the manner in which the 
Claimants' claims in bankruptcy would be treated if a right to seniority 
integration is established. This ruling, unlike the standing issue, does 
not turn on an interpretation of the LPPs. Thus, the bankruptcy court's 
determination of the status of the claims and the district court's refusal 
to consider the merits of the standing issue was not inconsistent. 
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       payment, whether or not such right to an equitable 
       remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, 
       matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, 
       or unsecured. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 101(5). The term "claim" as defined in the 
bankruptcy code is construed broadly to permit debtors to 
meet all of their legal obligations in bankruptcy and to 
enable holders of claims to participate in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279, 83 
L.Ed.2d 649, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) ("Congress desired a 
broad definition of claim."); see, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of 
Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990) 
(debtors' obligation to pay restitution as a condition of 
probation which arose out of a criminal conviction for 
welfare fraud constituted a "debt" within the meaning of the 
bankruptcy code that gave rise to a "claim" under the code). 
 
Under section 101(5), an equitable remedy can be 
deemed a "claim" if that remedy "gives rise to a right of 
payment." We are guided as to what constitutes a "right of 
payment" under the bankruptcy code by the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Ohio v. Kovacs. In Kovacs, the 
petitioner, the State of Ohio, obtained an injunction 
ordering the respondent, William Kovacs, to clean up a 
hazardous waste site. After Kovacs failed to comply with the 
injunction, the State obtained the appointment of a 
receiver, who was directed to take possession of all of 
Kovacs' assets and property and to clean up the waste site. 
Subsequent to the appointment of the receiver, Kovacs filed 
for bankruptcy. In response, the State filed a complaint in 
bankruptcy seeking a declaration that Kovacs' obligation 
under the injunction was not dischargeable in bankruptcy 
because it was not a liability on a "claim" under the 
bankruptcy code. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the obligation imposed by 
the injunction had been converted to an obligation to pay 
money that was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Kovacs, 469 
U.S. at 283. Critical to the Court's conclusion was its 
determination that the appointment of a receiver had 
dispossessed Kovacs of the property and therefore, had 
removed Kovacs' ability to cooperate with the receiver and 
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remove the waste from the site in compliance with the 
injunction. Specifically, the Court stated: 
 
       The injunction surely obliged Kovacs to clean up the 
       site. But when he failed to do so, rather than prosecute 
       Kovacs under the environmental laws or bring civil or 
       criminal contempt proceedings, the State secured the 
       appointment of a receiver, who was ordered to take 
       possession of all of Kovacs' nonexempt assets . . . and 
       to comply with the injunction . . . . As wise as this 
       course may have been, it dispossessed Kovacs, 
       removed his authority over the site, and divested him 
       of assets that might have been used by him to clean up 
       the property . . . Although Kovacs had been ordered to 
       "cooperate" with the receiver, he was disabled by the 
       receivership from personally taking charge of and 
       carrying out the removal of wastes from the property. 
       What the receiver wanted from Kovacs after 
       bankruptcy was the money to defray cleanup costs . .. 
       Had Kovacs furnished the necessary funds, either 
       before or after bankruptcy, there seems little doubt 
       that the receiver and the State would have been 
       satisfied. 
 
Id. at 283. Thus, the Court concluded that under the 
circumstances, the clean up order had been converted into 
an obligation to pay money. Id. at 283. 
 
In In re Torwico Electronics, Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 
1993), we addressed the issue whether a regulatory 
obligation directing a Chapter 11 debtor to develop a plan 
to ameliorate an ongoing environmental hazard could be 
converted into a "claim" in bankruptcy. In that case, 
Torwico Electronics, a manufacturing business, filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and listed the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (the 
"Department") as a creditor with a disputed and 
unliquidated claim. After Torwico filed its petition for 
bankruptcy, the Department performed an on-site 
inspection of Torwico's property and found hazardous 
waste, for which it issued a notice of violation to Torwico. 
Two months later, the deadline for filing proofs of claim in 
Torwico's bankruptcy case passed. The Department had 
failed to file any proof of claim by this deadline. 
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The Department, seeking to enforce Torwico's obligation 
under state and federal environmental laws, issued an 
Administrative Order requiring Torwico to submit a written 
closure plan for the hazardous site and assessing a 
monetary penalty for failure to take action under the earlier 
notice of violation. The Order specifically stated: "All 
obligations are imposed pursuant to the police powers of 
the State of New Jersey, intended to protect the public 
health, safety, welfare, and environment." 
 
In bankruptcy court, both parties sought summary 
judgment. Torwico maintained that the obligation 
constituted a "claim" under the bankruptcy code and that 
the State's failure to file a timely proof of claim was fatal to 
the State's position that Torwico was responsible for the 
obligation. The State, however, argued that the claims 
involved were regulatory obligations, not bankruptcy 
claims, and that Torwico was obligated to remedy the 
violations addressed in the Order pursuant to state and 
federal law. 
 
Turning our attention to the Supreme Court's analysis in 
Kovacs, we explicitly noted that this case was unlike 
Kovacs in that the State was not demanding that Torwico 
pay money to it, but rather was requesting it to take action 
to ameliorate an ongoing hazard. Torwico Electronics, 8 F.3d 
at 150. Next, we shifted our focus to the nature of the 
obligation imposed by the Order and concluded that it was 
not an order for breach of an obligation that gave rise to the 
right of payment. Specifically, we noted: 
 
       The state here found that the seepage pit was a 
       continuing problem that was leaking hazardous 
       material into the surrounding environment. Thus, the 
       state is not asserting a "repackaged claim for 
       damages"; rather there is an ongoing and continuing 
       threat and . . . an obligation on the part of the debtor 
       to "ameliorate ongoing pollution emanating from 
       accumulated wastes" . . . The state has no "right to 
       payment" here. What it has is a right to force the 
       debtor to comply with applicable environmental laws by 
       remedying an existing hazard. 
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Id. (quoting In re Chateauguay, 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 
1991)).9 
 
Kovacs indicates, and Torwico Electronics implies, that a 
right of payment under the bankruptcy code is, essentially, 
an obligation to pay money. Thus, the issue we must decide 
is whether monetary payment is an alternative for the 
equitable remedy of seniority integration. See Matter of 
Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[an] example of a 
`claim' is a right to an equitable remedy that can be 
satisfied by an `alternative' right to payment"). The district 
court answered this question affirmatively, and we agree. 
 
We begin our analysis by noting that here, when ALPA 
filed its proof of claim in bankruptcy court, it enumerated 
the claim as one for money damages, in addition to specific 
performance, arising out of the underlying LPP labor 
arbitration dispute. Indeed, in its supplemental pre-hearing 
statement filed at the arbitration, ALPA specifically noted 
that it sought "damages in the form of back pay and front 
pay against . . . Continental . . . in addition to integrated 
pilot positions." This is not the end of our inquiry, however. 
Consistent with the analyses in Kovacs and Torwico 
Electronics, we are compelled to examine the nature of the 
remedy sought and to ascertain whether it can give rise to 
a right of payment. We conclude that it does. 
 
Unlike the obligation at issue in Torwico Electronics, 
seniority integration is not a remedy tailored to enforce 
compliance with any federal or state laws or regulations. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Torwico Electronics, we were persuaded by, and explicitly applied, 
the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
In re Chateauguay, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1990). In that case, the court 
addressed the issue of what constituted a claim in the context of the 
bankruptcy of an entity that operated hazardous waste sites. There, the 
court stated: 
 
       Where an order imposes obligations distinct from any obligation to 
       stop or ameliorate ongoing pollution, the order presents a claim if 
       the government could have done the work itself and then sought 
       reimbursement; under such circumstances there is a breach of an 
       obligation that gives rise to a right of payment. 
 
In re Chateauguay, 944 F.2d at 1008. 
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The source of the remedy is a provision contained in an 
agreement. By its contractual nature, it is clear that the 
remedy was not created to enforce compliance with any 
particular mandate. Rather, by its terms, seniority 
integration is a discrete remedy, specifically created to 
protect a group of employees.10 Thus, the remedy is a 
vehicle by which to provide a benefit or compensation to 
individuals who are covered by the explicit terms of the 
agreement and who, by the agreement's terms, are entitled 
to enforce the remedy. 
 
Although the collective bargaining agreement is silent as 
to the remedy following a breach of the agreement, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a "corollary right to payment of 
liquidated damages" would flow from a breach giving rise to 
the equitable remedy under the LPPs. See Matter of Udell, 
18 F.3d at 408 (holding that a right to an equitable remedy 
for breach of performance is a claim if the same breach also 
gives rise to a right of payment with respect to the equitable 
remedy or if the right to payment is an alternative to the 
right to an equitable remedy). See generally Chauffeurs, 
Teamsters, Etc. v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 108 L.Ed.2d 519, 
110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990) (claim based on breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement is comparable to a breach 
of contract claim for which a legal award of money damages 
in the form of back pay is permitted); Stewart v. KHD Deutz 
of America Corp., 75 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1996) (breach of 
[collective bargaining claim] claim is most analogous to a 
claim for breach of contract). The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Int'l 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 913 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1990), is 
instructive. 
 
In that case, the court upheld an award of monetary 
damages for breach of a contract mandating seniority 
integration. There, Van Waters, a seller and distributor of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The LPPs specifically state: 
 
        Section 1. The fundamental scope and purpose of the conditions 
       hereinafter specified are to provide for compensatory allowances to 
       employees who may be affected by [a] proposed merger . . . . 
 
(Labor Protective Provisions, section 1). 
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chemicals, purchased its competitor, McKesson. Pursuant 
to the acquisition, Van Waters agreed to assume the terms 
and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement that 
existed between McKesson and its employees' union, Local 
70. Although the collective bargaining agreement contained 
a seniority integration clause triggered by a purchase or 
sale of McKesson, Van Waters refused to honor the terms 
of the clause after the purchase was complete. Accordingly, 
Local 70 filed a grievance based on Van Waters' failure to 
integrate the seniority of the former McKesson employees 
with Van Waters' seniority list. 
 
Arbitration of the dispute was complicated by two 
additional factors. First, Van Waters maintained a collective 
bargaining agreement with another union, Local 287. 
Second, the collective bargaining agreement between Local 
70 and McKesson/Van Waters contained a clause 
precluding the arbitrator from determining any 
jurisdictional dispute arising between Local 70 and any 
other union. The effect of the latter factor was that any 
ruling on a jurisdictional dispute would be outside of the 
scope of the arbitrator's authority. As seniority integration 
of Local 70's employees would affect the seniority of Van 
Waters' employees and create a potential conflict between 
the two unions, resolution of the dispute implicated the 
arbitrator's authority to resolve the dispute. 
 
At the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator granted Local 
70's grievance demanding that the seniority of the former 
McKesson employees be considered as integrated. However, 
the arbitrator declined to enforce seniority integration to 
avoid any jurisdictional dispute. Instead, the arbitrator 
ruled that the employees would receive damages for any 
wages and other benefits lost due to Van Waters' failure to 
consider their seniority. In so ruling, the arbitrator noted 
that the Local 70 agreement contained a provision that 
permitted the recovery of damages by employees arising out 
of an employer's failure to require a purchaser to assume 
the obligations of the collective bargaining agreement. The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the arbitrator's award, concluding that 
the arbitrator properly fashioned a monetary award to the 
former McKesson employees "for the breach of the terms of 
Local 70's collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 742. 
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Van Waters illustrates that a monetary damage award 
can be enforced as an alternative to, or can arise with 
respect to, the equitable remedy of seniority integration. 
The award is not cumulative, nor does it address a separate 
remedial concern. Rather, it serves as a substitute for the 
performance of an equitable remedy that cannot otherwise 
be enforced. See Van Waters, 913 F.2d at 741 ("if violated, 
[the seniority rights provided under the collective 
bargaining agreement] could be remedied by an award of 
damages rather than specific performance."). 
 
We find support for the proposition that monetary awards 
are a viable alternative to the equitable remedy of seniority 
integration in wrongful discharge cases where we have 
enforced awards of monetary damages in lieu of 
reinstatement. Much like reinstatement, seniority 
integration is a "make whole" remedy, the purpose of which 
is to restore the employee to the economic status quo that 
would exist but for the employer's conduct. See Franks v. 
Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976). 
 
Although we have recognized that reinstatement is the 
preferred remedy to address cases of wrongful discharge, 
we have enforced monetary awards as a viable alternative 
where reinstatement is impractical. See Maxfield v. Sinclair 
International, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985) (front pay is an 
appropriate alternative to reinstatement where the 
relationship between the parties may be so damaged by 
animosity that reinstatement is impracticable and the 
remedial purposes of the statute would be frustrated if 
front pay were not available as an alternative remedy); Goss 
v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(same); see also Ellis v. Ringgold School District, 832 F.2d 
27 (3d Cir. 1987) (reinstatement may be denied when 
animosity between the parties makes such remedy 
impracticable). Cf. Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 
1994) (special circumstances indicating that tensions 
between the parties exceed those which normally 
accompany reinstatement or indicating "irreparable" 
animosity among the parties involved justifies denial of 
reinstatement).11 Similar to the conditions that can result 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Squires is distinguishable. That case involved an employee who 
challenged the district court's failure to direct reinstatement to his 
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from the enforcement of reinstatement, disruption to the 
work environment, irreparable damage to work 
relationships, and hostility and animosity are all very 
probable conditions that can result from the enforcement of 
seniority integration. Considering the similarity in purpose 
between the two remedies, the rationale underlying the 
enforcement of an alternative remedy to fulfill their 
remedial purposes, and the similarity in the impracticality 
of enforcing the remedies under particular circumstances, 
we are certain that a money damage award is an 
appropriate alternative to seniority integration. 
 
Moreover, we are convinced that the particular 
circumstances of this case might make the enforcement of 
the equitable remedy of seniority integration impractical 
such that an alternative money damage award would be 
appropriate. The seniority integration sought by the LPP 
Claimants and the Group of 31 could potentially result in 
the displacement of many Continental pilots. Such 
displacement has the potential to create an environment 
rife with hostility and low employee morale, not to mention 
a detrimental effect on employer-employee relations. 12 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
former position after a jury sustained a First Amendment constitutional 
challenge to his employer's failure to reappoint him. Reversing the 
district court's decision not to reinstate the employee, we stated, "[t]he 
fact that reinstatement might have disturbing consequences, revive old 
antagonisms, or breed difficult working conditions usually is not enough 
to outweigh the important first amendment policies that reinstatement 
serves [absent] probable adverse consequences[that] weigh so heavily 
that they counsel the court against imposing this preferred remedy." 
Squires, 54 F.3d at 175 (quoting Banks v. Burkich, 788 F.2d 1161, 1165 
(6th Cir. 1988)). Thus, it is clear that our decision to remand with 
instructions to reinstate the appellant was driven by the constitutional 
nature of the claims and the compelling need to enforce reinstatement to 
remedy the violation. As the claims here do not involve constitutional 
concerns, we cannot conclude that any remedy short of seniority 
integration will not suffice to remedy the alleged violation. 
 
12. We note that nothing about the imposition of monetary damages as 
a substitute for seniority integration frustrates the remedial purpose of 
the LPPs. Cf. Franks, 424 U.S. at 771 (in a Title VII case, "the denial of 
seniority relief to victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is 
permissible `only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not 
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circumstances indicate that seniority integration would not 
be a feasible remedy and that an alternative remedy of 
monetary damages would be appropriate. Therefore, we 
conclude that the right to seniority integration gives rise to 
a "right of payment" such that the remedy constitutes a 
"claim" dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
 
We take care to note the boundaries of our holding. It is 
not our purpose to suggest the award the arbitrator should 
grant, if an award is warranted upon disposition of the LPP 
dispute. Our holding is limited to how the claims should be 
treated in bankruptcy. Simply put, we hold that any claim 
based on an award of seniority integration arising out of the 
resolution of the LPP dispute will be treated as a claim in 
bankruptcy giving rise to a right of payment. As such, the 
right to seniority integration is satisfiable by the payment of 
money damages. 
 
D. Arguments of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Continental 
 
1. Dissolution of the Injunction 
 
Continental challenges the district court's ruling vacating 
the injunction against the continuation of the Kasher 
Arbitration on two grounds. First, it argues that contrary to 
the district court's conclusion, the permanent injunction, 
imposed by the Plan of Confirmation, complied with the 
mandate of Rule 65(d).13 Next, it contends that if the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination 
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered 
through past discrimination.' "). Indeed, the LPPs set forth as its scope 
and purpose "to provide for compensatory allowances to employees who 
may be affected by the proposed merger of " the carriers. See discussion 
supra note 2. An award of monetary damages is consistent with the 
articulated scope and purpose, and is therefore appropriate. 
 
13. Section 12.19 of the plan of reorganization provided: 
 
        12.19 Injunction Relating to Eastern Claims .  This Joint Plan 
       permanently enjoins, and the Confirmation Order shall constitute 
       and provide for a permanent injunction against, any Person or 
       entity, including without limitation, (i) any present or former 
       employee of Eastern . . . (ii) any labor union or collective 
bargaining 
       representative acting or purporting to act on behalf of any such 
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permanent injunction did not comply with Rule 65(d), the 
statutory injunction referenced in the bankruptcy court's 
confirmation order survived the permanent injunction and 
is valid. We need not decide whether the permanent 
injunction failed to comply with the mandate of Rule 65(d). 
We conclude that even assuming that the statutory 
injunction survived the permanent injunction and is not 
subject to the requirements set forth in Rule 65(d), 
Continental's failure to reject the collective bargaining 
agreement consistent with the mandate of section 1113 of 
the Code renders the injunction invalid. 
 
The Confirmation Order issued by the bankruptcy court 
specifically incorporated the statutory injunction prescribed 
by the bankruptcy code. The order states: 
 
       In accordance with section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code 
       . . . this Order: 
 
       (ii) operates as an injunction against the 
       commencement or continuation of an action, the 
       employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or 
       offset any such debt or Claim as a personal liability of 
       the Debtors . . . . 
 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Confirming The Debtors' Revised Second Amended Joint 
Plan of Reorganization). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       employees or former employees . . . from commencing, conducting or 
       continuing any suit, arbitration, action or other proceeding in any 
       place or forum against any Debtor, . . . This injunction shall 
apply, 
       without limitation, to any suit, arbitration, action or proceeding. 
 
(Debtors' Revised Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, 
S 12.19). 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) states: 
 
       Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order 
shall 
       set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; 
       shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the 
       complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be 
       restrained. . . . 
 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). 
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Assuming, as the district court did and as Continental 
argues, that the section 524 statutory injunction is not 
subject to the requirements of Rule 65(d), we conclude that 
the district court properly vacated the injunction against 
the Kasher Arbitration. Section 1113 of the Code provides: 
 
       (a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has 
       been appointed under the provisions of this chapter 
       . . . may assume or reject a collective bargaining 
       agreement only in accordance with the provisions of 
       this section. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1113(a). The provision outlines the procedure 
that a debtor or appointed trustee must follow to 
successfully reject a collective bargaining agreement, 
including, but not limited to: (1) the submission of a 
proposal to an authorized representative of the employees 
affected by the terms of the agreement prior to thefiling of 
an application to reject the agreement, 11 U.S.C. 
S 524(b)(1)(A); and (2) good faith attempts to reach a 
"mutually satisfactory modification" of the agreement, 11 
U.S.C. S 524(b)(2). 
 
The intent behind section 1113 is to preclude debtors or 
trustees in bankruptcy from unilaterally terminating, 
altering, or modifying the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement without following its strict mandate. In re 
Ionosphere, 922 F.2d at 989-90. Moreover, the provision 
operates to preclude the application of other bankruptcy 
code provisions to the advantage of debtors and trustees to 
permit them to escape the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement without complying with the requirements of 
section 1113. See id. 
 
Continental does not dispute that it did not follow the 
requirements set forth in section 1113 to reject the 
collective bargaining agreement. Instead, Continental 
suggests that the imposition of the injunction was 
consistent with the bankruptcy court's authority to 
determine the administrative priority and status of the 
bankruptcy claims. Thus, it argues, section 1113 cannot 
 
                                30 
 
 
 
divest the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to exercise this 
authority and impose the injunction. We disagree. 14 
 
The injunction allowed Continental to avoid its obligation 
to arbitrate the merger dispute under the LPPs. In In re 
Ionosphere, the Court specifically held that the application 
of the section 362 automatic stay provision to effectuate 
this result in the absence of the debtor's compliance with 
the requirements of section 1113 was impermissible, as "its 
application would allow a debtor unilaterally to avoid its 
obligation to arbitrate." In re Ionosphere, 922 F.2d at 993. 
Here, the enforcement of the statutory injunction in the 
face of Continental's failure to follow the requirements of 
section 1113 is no different. As the enforcement of the 
injunction would have the effect of permitting Continental 
to escape its duty to arbitrate under the collective 
bargaining agreement, we decline to enforce the statutory 
injunction in the absence of Continental's compliance with 
the requirements to reject the collective bargaining  
agreement.15 
 
2. Duty to Arbitrate 
 
Finally, we reject Continental's argument that it has no 
duty to arbitrate the LPP dispute. Throughout this 
litigation, Continental has premised its arguments on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We have not been required previously to address the applicability of 
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements when the employer is 
in bankruptcy, although the issue was raised in a case we decided last 
year. See Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1121 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e 
need not decide that interesting issue here."). This case, however, 
requires us to do so. 
 
15. Despite our conclusion that failure to comply with section 1113 bars 
an injunction of the arbitration, we reject the Claimants' contention that 
the substitution of a monetary damage award, in lieu of seniority 
integration, is not permitted under section 1113 because it alters or 
modifies the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The 
bankruptcy court's determination of the administrative priority and 
status of the claims was not based on an interpretation of the LPPs. Nor 
did it predetermine the appropriate remedy warranted under the LPPs, 
thus "nullifying" the agreement and infringing on the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction. Substitution of the equitable remedy in no way amounts to 
an alteration or termination of the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
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assumption that it is bound by the LPPs and has a duty to 
arbitrate the LPP dispute. In so doing, Continental reaped 
enormous benefits: (1) it was able to obtain a ruling that 
the claim based on seniority integration could be treated as 
a right to payment in bankruptcy, satisfiable by a monetary 
award; and (2) in turn, it received backing from investors 
for its plan of reorganization, which was critical to plan 
confirmation by the bankruptcy court.16  Now, Continental 
maintains that there has been no determination that it is 
bound by the LPPs and that the case should be remanded 
to the district court for a determination on the merits of its 
duty to arbitrate the dispute. 
 
In light of the overwhelming advantage that Continental 
derived from maintaining the position that it was bound by 
the collective bargaining agreement, and thus, had a duty 
to arbitrate the LPP dispute, we refuse to allow Continental 
to repudiate that representation and return to the district 
court to litigate the issue whether it is bound by the 
agreement. See EF Operating Corp. v. American Bldgs., 993 
F.2d 1046, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993) ("one cannot casually cast 
aside representations, oral or written, in the course of 
litigation simply because it is convenient to do so . . . a 
reviewing court may properly consider the representations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. It is apparent that Continental assumed this position in efforts to 
obtain judicial confirmation of its plan of reorganization. In its Motion 
for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Continental stated: 
 
       1. [Debtors] make this Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On 
       Their Partial Objection to Claims Based On Certain Alleged Labor 
       Protective Provisions Involving The Air Line Pilots Association, 
       International ("ALPA") And Eastern Air Lines, Inc. ("Eastern") in 
       order to ensure that they will be able to reorganize successfully 
and, 
       more specifically, to satisfy a condition of the Investment 
Agreement 
       dated November 9, 1992 ("Investment Agreement"), by and among 
       [the investors] and the Debtors. In addition to monetary damages, 
       these claims seek to require Continental to hire several thousand 
       Eastern Air Lines pilots, which if granted would necessitate the 
       displacement of an equal number of incumbent Continental pilots. 
       Debtors seek in this Motion a legal determination that the "LPP 
       Claims" . . . are, at best, dischargeable, prepetition general 
       unsecured claims within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code 
       Section 101(5). 
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made in the appellate brief to be binding as a form of 
judicial estoppel, and decline to address a new legal 
argument based on a later repudiation of those 
representations."). Accordingly, we conclude that 
Continental is bound by its prior representations that it has 
a duty to arbitrate the LPP dispute. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's 
decision in all respects. 
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